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Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labeling:
Are Workers Bayesian Decision Makers?
By W. KiP VISCUSIAND CHARLESJ. O'CONNOR*
A fundamental issue in the economics of
uncertainty is how individuals process information and make choices under uncertainty.'
In a recent analysis of the findings on risk
perception, Kenneth Arrow (1982) concluded that the evidence regarding individual
rationality was, at best, quite mixed. A prominent example of apparent irrationality of
actual consumer behavior is that consumers,
who presumably are risk averse, have failed
to purchase heavily subsidized federal flood
insurance.2 In the case of the market for
hazardous jobs, which is the focus of this
study, Viscusi (1979) found that workers'
risk perceptions were positively correlated
with the industry risk and that workers who
perceived job risks received compensating
wage differentials.3 Nevertheless, workers in
high risk jobs displayed behavior consistent
with an adaptive response in which workers
accept jobs whose risks are not fully understood, learn about these risks based on their

on-the-job experiences, and then quit if these
experiences are sufficiently unfavorable given
the wage for the job.
Although the positive injury rate-quit rate
linkage is consistent with an adaptive response, there has been no study that has
investigated the dynamics of this relationship. Do workers learn about risks on the
job, and does this change in perceptions lead
workers to revise their reservation wage rates
in the expected manner? More fundamentally, even in the absence of such learning,
do workers have subjective risk assessments
that generate compensating differentials in
the manner that is consistent with studies of
risk premiums for hazardous occupations and
industries? In this paper we will extend this
line of research by analyzing the nature of
workers' risk assessments, how workers process information, and how changes in risk
perceptions affect their decisions.
Since no existing data sets provide information on the evolution of workers' risk
perceptions, we undertook a sample survey
in which we ascertained worker responses to
labels of potentially hazardous chemicals. We
chose this form of information because the
chemical industry already has some experience in conveying this information in a
manner that workers can understand, thus
making it possible to analyze the learning
process rather than focusing on the design of
the format for the information. In addition,
this type of risk information has substantial
policy relevance since chemical labeling is
the major component of the OSHA hazard
communication policy. This $3 billion policy
was the most expensive social regulation issued during the first three years of the
Reagan Administration.4

* Professor and Director, Center for Study of Business Regulation, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC 27706, and consultant, Green
Farms, CT 06436, respectively. This research was supported in part by the Center for the Study of Business
Regulation, Duke University. We are indebted to
William Evans for a superb computer programming
effort, to Henry Feng for compilation of the survey
results, and to John Payne and seminar participants at
several universities for helpful comments.
'A lucid discussion of the relationship of information
to economic behavior is provided by Kenneth Arrow
(1974).
2Howard Kunreuther's (1976) analysis of flood insurance stresses a lack of consumer information as an
important factor. A major theme of this study is that
workers also are acting within a context of highly imperfect information.
3Viscusi
(1979) also linked compensating differentials
to objective risk measures, yielding comparable wage
premiums. Other studies in the compensating differentials literature include Richard Thaler and Sherwin
Rosen (1976), Robert Smith (1976), and Charles Brown
(1980). Smith (1979) and Viscusi (1983) provide critical
surveys of this literature.

4The EPA pesticide and toxic chemical regulations
also include chemical labeling as a policy option. See
Susan Hadden (1983) for a review of the role of labeling
policies of federal agencies.
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In Section I we discuss the nature of the
sample and present the empirical results for
the situation before information provision to
establish a reference point for subsequent
results. These findings are also of interest in
their own right because the survey provides
extensive risk-related information that included detailed risk-assessment questions and
information on whether workers would repeat their job choice. These data will consequently enable us to make a more direct link
than in previous research between workers'
risk perceptions and labor market outcomes,
such as compensating differentials for risk.
The effect of the chemical labels on workers'
risk perceptions is the subject of Section II.
We estimate both the risk level implied by
the hazard warning and the informational
content relative to the worker's prior beliefs.
This evidence is consistent with a Bayesian
learning process in which workers retain some
influence of their priors and incorporate the
new information in the expected manner.
Section III's analysis of the effect of risk
information on compensating differentials
and worker turnover provides the first explicit test of the effect of changes in workers'
risk perceptions on labor market performance.
The overall picture that emerges is that
workers begin jobs with imperfect information, but there are many rational elements to
worker behavior, and the extent of riskrelated mismatches of jobs and workers is
not rampant. After acquiring risk information, most workers display the capacity to
update their probabilistic beliefs in a manner
that is broadly consistent with Bayesian
analysis. The adaptive responses that emerge
suggest that workers are engaged in an ongoing experimentation process in which they
learn about the risks posed by their job and
quit once the position becomes sufficiently
unattractive.
I. The Sample and Baseline Results

Since no existing body of data provides
longitudinal information on workers' risk
perceptions, we developed a survey to enable
us to analyze worker responses to job hazard
information. The focus of this section is on
the nature of the sample and the empirical
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results for the situation before workers received risk information. Because of the more
comprehensive nature of the risk questions,
it is possible to broaden the empirical support for the principal labor market impacts
of employment hazards.
The sample consisted of 335 employees in
the chemical industry. During the first six
months of 1982, the managers responsible
for chemical labeling interviewed workers at
four plant locations of three major chemical
firms. The operations represented included
research and development as well as manufacturing. The sample included a broad range
of occupational groups exposed to chemicals. Engineers, technicians, chemists, mechanics, researchers, and supervisors were all
included. Over half of the sample-187
workers-consisted
of workers who were
either on hourly pay or were technicians.
This group, which we will denote by BC/
TECH, closely parallels the blue-collar subsample analyzed in Viscusi (1979) and will
be the focus of much of the empirical work
in this section.
Table 1 summarizes the sample characteristics for the full sample and the BC/TECH
subsample. The sample characteristics follow
the pattern one would expect for a national
chemical firm. The average worker age is 39,
and the majority of all workers are white
males (only 7 percent blacks and 43 percent
females). The individuals averaged two years
of college education, or years of schooling
(EDUC) equal to 14. Almost two-thirds of
the sample were married with an average of
1.36 children (KIDS). Their total work experience (EXPER) was 18 years, 8 of which
were at the particular firm (TENURE). The
average annual earnings (EARNG) was over
$21,000.
The most distinctive characteristic of the
sample was the inclusion of a series of risk
perception questions. The DANGER variable pertains to whether or not the worker's
job exposes him to dangerous or unhealthy
conditions. The wording of this question
parallels that in the University of Michigan
Survey of Working Conditions (1975) used by
Viscusi (1979) and will be used in assessing
the comparability of the empirical results. In
that study, 52 percent of the blue-collar
workers viewed their jobs as dangerous. The
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CHARACTERISTICS: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

Variable

Full Sample

BC/TECH Subsample

AGE (in years)

38.8
(11.8)
0.07
0.57
14.44
(3.21)
0.64
1.36
(1.52)
18.38
(11.68)
8.19
(7.22)
$21,120.4
($8,332.1)
.57
0.10
(0.06)
0.36
0.11
0.79
0.97
0.12
0.05
335

38.9
(12.8)
0.10
0.42
12.47
(2.05)
0.62
1.10
(1.28)
19.19
(13.0)
7.15
(6.41)
$15,768.6
($3,596.6)
0.50
0.09
(0.07)
0.35
0.10
0.77
0.96
0.12
0.05
185

BLACK (0-1 race dummy variable (dv))a
MALE (0-1 sex dv)a
EDUC (years of schooling)
MARRIED (0-1 marital dv)a
KIDS (number of children)
EXPER (years of work experience)
TENURE (years of experience at firm)
EARNG (annual earnings)
DANGER (0-1 risk dv)a
RISK (scaled risk)
HRISK (0-1 high risk dv)a
WPREM (0-1 perceived wage premium dv)
TAKEA (0-1 repeat job choice dv)a
TAKEB (0-1 repeat job choice dv)a
QUITA (0-1 quit intention dv)
QUITB (0-1 quit intention dv)
Sample Size

aStandard deviations for 0-1 dummy variables are omitted since they can be
calculated from their fraction m in the sample, where the standard deviation is
(m - mr2)5.

results here are quite similar, as 57 percent of
the overall sample viewed their jobs as
dangerous, with 50 percent of the BC/TECH
subsample perceiving some risk.
Although the mean DANGER levels are
not unexpected, the relative riskiness rankings are the opposite of what one might
expect since the BC/TECH group presumably faces greater risks. Whether or not this
is actually the case is not clearcut since the
white-collar research chemists may in fact
incur greater health risks than, for example,
maintenance personnel. The more similar results for the continuous RISK variable discussed below suggest, however, that these
results may not stem from an actual difference in riskiness. Rather, the BC/TECH
workers may have a less stringent risk level
cutoff for considering whether their jobs are
hazardous. Since willingness to accept a risk
is negatively related to one's wealth, it is not
unexpected that higher-income workers are

more likely to regard a job as dangerous, for
any given risk level.5
Except in the case of one study using the
DANGER variable, all previous analyses of
risk premiums have used objective occupational or industry risk measures. For this
paper we developed a variable that would
reflect the worker's subjective assessment of
the BLS injury and illness frequency rate for
his job. From the standpoint of the theoretical foundations of the compensating differential theory, the wage-risk relationship
should be driven by such subjective risk perceptions. Aggregative risk variables simply
serve as an objective proxy for this variable.
To overcome the difficulties arising from
different danger reference points and to provide a continuous risk measure that will make

5Educational differences and related differences in
ability to perceive risks may also play a role.
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possible a detailed analysis of worker learning, we developed a continuous RISK variable. We presented to each worker a linear
scale, ranging from very safe to dangerous.
To provide an objective reference point, an
arrow marked the average U.S. private sector
injury and illness rate. Each respondent
marked on the scale the risk level that he
assessed for his job. This variable was then
converted into probabilistic terms, that is,
scaled between 0 and 1, where risk is on a
scale comparable to the BLS annual injury
frequency rate. The mean RISK levels for
the full sample and the BC/TECH subsample are comparable to the national average
private sector risk probabilities and about 50
percent larger than the recent levels of the
chemical industry's injury and illness frequency rate. This discrepancy is not unexpected since BLS statistics primarily capture
safety-related accidents and underreport the
long-term illnesses from chemical exposures;
reported injury rates will understate the actual risk level.
Using the RISK responses, we also created
a job hazard dummy variable similar to
DANGER except that the risk threshold
reference point was the same for all respondents. The high-risk variable HRISK assumed a value of 1 if the worker faced a risk
above the U.S. average, and 0 otherwise. A
third of the sample viewed theirjobs as being
high risk, and two-thirds viewed their jobs as
being comparatively safe. In conjunction with
the earlier RISK results, these findings suggest that the chemical industry's relatively
good accident record may be a reasonable
reflection of most workers' perceptions, but
the presence of substantial health risks leads
a sizable minority to consider their jobs particularly hazardous.
Since the time of Adam Smith, economists
have observed that perceived risks will generate compensating wage differentials since
workers will demand extra compensation for
jobs that pose extra risk.6 Table 2 summarizes the risk variable results for equations
in which annual earnings (EARNG) and its

6See fn. 3 above for a list of several previous risk
premium studies.
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natural logarithm (LNEARNG) serve as the
dependent variables. Each equation also included an extensive group of variables that
typically enter such earnings equations, such
as the individual's education and work experience. For the BC/TECH subsample, the
annual risk premium of $700-$800 for
DANGER was of roughly the same magnitude as the $900 annual compensation found
for the blue-collar subsample in Viscusi
(1979) for both DANGER and the BLS injury rate.
As with that study, the full sample results
were not successful because of an inability to
disentangle the wage premiums for risk from
the positive overall relationship between job
quality and individual income. The change in
earnings equations in Section III will not be
subject to this difficulty. Restricting the sample to males only eliminates some of the
problems arising from failing to control adequately for the omitted variables that determine individual earnings. Male workers'
jobs tend to involve more direct handling of
chemicals, and the annual risk premiums are
considerably larger than for the BC/TECH
subsample.
Of the three risk variables, DANGER
yielded the largest annual risk premiums.
These were somewhat larger than those for
RISK, which were about $100 less. The
above-average risk variable HRISK led to
the smallest annual risk premiums, but the
effects were consistently positive and statistically significant (at the 5 percent level, onetailed test). This pattern may reflect the
shortcomings of the HRISK variable, which
may be a less accurate measure of the underlying job risk, thus leading to a downward bias in its coefficient. The general
implications of these findings are less ambiguous. The consistently significant results
using the subjective risk variables and the
similarity in the DANGER and RISK premiums to those in earlier studies should bolster one's confidence in the validity of the
compensating differential theory.
A closely related issue is whether workers
are aware of any risk premiums. Since no
previous study had asked workers whether
they believed that they received a risk premium, we developed a variable WPREM that
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DIFFERENTIAL
RESULTSa
TABLE2-SUMMARYOFCOMPENSATING
Dependent
Variable

Sample

Risk
Variable

Risk Coefficient

EARNG

BC/TECH

DANGER

LNEARNG

BC/TECH

DANGER

EARNG

BC/TECH

RISK

LNEARNG

BC/TECH

RISK

EARNG

BC/TECH

HRISK

LNEARNG

BC/TECH

HRISK

EARNG

Full (males)

DANGER

LNEARNG

Full (males)

DANGER

EARNG

Full (males)

WPREM

LNEARNG

Full (males)

WPREM

EARNG

Full

DANGER

LNEARNG

Full

DANGER

1577.2
(438.1)
0.097
(0.029)
6898.4
(3461.1)
0.479
(0.231)
738.4
(465.5)
0.053
(0.031)
2117.5
(775.6)
0.124
(0.036)
1583.1
(1179.9)
.1094
(.0549)
169.03
(529.51)
0.018
(0.025)

Average Annual
Risk Premium
$788.6
$746.5
$636.2
$665.3
$258.4
$289.8
$1385.7
$1875.3
b

$278.8
b
b

aEach equation also includes the following variables: AGE, BLACK, MALE, EDUC, MARRIED, KIDS, and
EXPER. The full sample results also include a BC/TECH dummy variable. The standard errors are shown in
parentheses below the coefficients.
bAnnual risk premiums are not reported since the coefficients are not statistically significant (at the 5 percent level,
one-tailed test).

assumed value of 1 if the worker believed
that he received higher pay because of the
nature of the chemical industry and 0
otherwise. This variable reflects compensating differentials for working in the chemical
industry as opposed to some other industry,
not risk premiums per se. Since two-thirds of
the sample regarded their jobs as safer than
the U.S. average, these incremental premiums should not be large. Only 10 percent
of the sample believed they received such a
chemical industry premium, and those that
did eamed an average wage premium of under $300, controlling for other factors (see
LNEARNG equation, Table 2). As expected,
the probability that the worker perceives a
risk premium is strongly and positively related to each of the three risk variables, as
the logit results in Table 3 indicate.
Since over one-third of the sample believed that they faced above-average risks

and only one-tenth acknowledge the existence of relative wage premiums, roughly
one-quarter of the sample might appear to
behave in a manner that is inconsistent with
the standard theory. This need not be the
case since workers may, for example, earn
some form of economic rent that makes the
job attractive despite the absence of a perceived relative risk premium. Moreover, since
the overall risk premiums average under
$1,000 annually and only $300 for the relative chemical industry differential, many respondents may not have believed that the
risk premium they received was sufficiently
large to make the chemical industry salary
substantially different from what could be
earned elsewhere.
Some portion of this group who perceive
risks but not relative risk premiums may,
however, be mismatched. On a conceptual
basis, there clearly is some potential for some
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TABLE 3-MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATESFOR
PERCEIVEDRISK PREMIUMAND TURNOVEREQUATIONa

Dependent
Variable

Risk
Variable

WPREM

DANGER

WPREM

RISK

WPREM

HRISK

TAKEA

DANGER

TAKEA

RISK

TAKEA

HRISK

QUITA

DANGER

QUITA

RISK

QUITA

HRISK

Coefficientb
2.96
(0.75)
6.89
(2.78)
0.54
(0.38)
-1.42
(0.35)
-11.22
(2.32)
-1.53
(0.30)
1.21
(0.48)
6.95
(2.86)
1.55
(0.42)

a Other variables entered in each equation include:
AGE, BLACK, MALE, EDUC, MARRIED, KIDS,
EXPER (in WPREM equations), TENURE (in all except WPREM equations), and EARNG (in all except
WPREM equations).
bAsymptotic standard errors are shown in parentheses.

labor market mismatches even with rational
behavior if workers have some imperfect
knowledge of the risks of the job which they
continually update as they acquire additional
information through their on-the-job experience.7 Wage premiums for risk will be observed, but workers in high-risk situations
will also tend to quit once they have learned
about the risks and have decided that the
risk compensation is insufficient. Although
past empirical work has focused`on worker
quitting,8 a related prediction is that if
workers were asked to repeat their job choice
based on current information, many workers

7See Viscusi (1979) for a formal presentation of this
model.
8The job hazard-quit results in Viscusi (1979) are
presented for aggregative quit rates, three national samples of panel quit data (Panel Study of Income Dynamics and two National Longitudinal Surveys), and
quit intention data from the Survey of Working Conditions.
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in high-risk jobs would be reluctant to do so.
Unlike worker quitting, this job acceptance
question is not influenced by transactions
costs of job changes, such as seniority rights.
This question also avoids the limitations of
the relative risk premium question, which
may not fully capture the overall desirability
of the job.
For the full sample, 79 percent of the
sample would decide without hesitation to
take the same job (TAKEA). The remaining
21 percent would either have some second
thoughts or would definitely not take the job.
Since 97 percent of all respondents would,
at most, "have some second thoughts"
(TAKEB), only 3 percent of the sample appears to have strong reservations about their
positions. The combination of the wage premium estimates and the widespread willingness to repeat the employment decision suggests that job risks are not a major source of
worker dissatisfaction. Few workers appear
to be seriously mismatched.
One mechanism by which mismatches are
remedied is through worker quitting. To
analyze the job hazard-quit relationship, we
developed quit intention variables utilizing
the same phrasing as did the Survey of Working Conditions questions analyzed in Viscusi
(1979). As shown in that study, this quit
intention measure yielded results that were
quite similar to those generated by actual
quit behavior. One-eighth of the sample was
very likely or somewhat likely to "make a
genuine effort to find a new job with another
employer within the next year" (QUITA),
but only 5 percent were very likely to do so
(QUITB). Some worker dissatisfaction is
clearly present, but there is not a large proportion of severely dissatisfied workers at the
firms in our sample.
The worker's job risk plays an instrumental role in the cases in which mismatches are
observed. Table 3 presents the maximum
likelihood estimates for the determinants of
two job satisfaction measures. In each case,
the equations also included a series of variables, such as worker age, that are strongly
linked to worker turnover. The probability
that the worker would repeat this job decision (TAKEA) is negatively related to
all perceived risk variables, controlling for
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worker earnings and other related factors. A
worker who views his job as dangerous
(DANGER), for example, will have a probability of repeating his initial job choice that
is .22 lower than those who do not. Similarly,
all of the job risk variables exert a positive
influence on QUITA, where the quit intention probability will increase from .06 to .19
-or over triple- if the worker views his job
as dangerous. Put somewhat differently, the
mean effect of the DANGER variable accounts for one-half of all quit intentions.
These results are consistent with a model
in which the worker's job choice among
potentially hazardous jobs is part of an
ongoing adaptive process. Workers' reservation wages will increase as their perceived
risks rise so that we will observe risk premiums for prior perceived risks and for some
risks discovered on the job. Risk that workers
learn about but for which they are not compensated sufficiently will generate quits.
While the evidence is consistent with this
general view, the intermediate learning linkage and the behavioral implications of
changes in risk assessments have not yet
been examined.
II. HazardInformationandRiskPerceptions
To obtain evidence on this learning process, we carried out the following risk information processing experiment in the second
part of the questionnaire. We presented each
worker with a hazard warning label for one
chemical that was not a current part of his
job. Each respondent was told that he would
use 100 lb. containers of this substance within
the context of his currentjob operations, but
that this chemical would replace the chemicals with which the individual was currently
working. The scenario was similar to that in
which a worker learns that the chemicals he
uses have been mislabelled. We provided
workers with "new information" rather than
informing them of existing hazards so as to
be able to distinguish the role of the hazard
warning from a priori knowledge about the
job, thus providing a context in which learning could be observed. We then asked each
worker how this change would affect his risk
perception and other aspects of his behavior.

DECEMBER 1984

Subsequent changes in risk perceptions consequently do not reflect an inadequacy in
workers' prior judgments, but rather how
information regarding a newly introduced
risk will alter the assessment of the job's
imp.lcations.
We assigned workers to one of four different labeling groups: sodium bicarbonate
(CARB), a lachrymator chloroacetophenone
(LAC), asbestos (ASB), and TNT. The
CARB control group was set at a relatively
smaller size since the primary focus was on
the implications of the three risky substances. Each of these workers was given the
information following a standard chemical
labeling format. Representative portions of
each label are given below:
SODIUM BICARBONATE. SPILL:
Sweep-up, place in an appropriate
chemical waste container...
CHLOROACETOPHENONE.
WARNING!
LACHRYMATORVAPOR AND DUST EXTREMELY
IRRITATING. Do not breathe dust or
vapor. Wear a self-contained breathing
apparatus...
ASBESTOS. DANGER! CANCER
HAZARD. Use with a NIOSH-Mesa
approved respirator. Use with approved goggles...
TNT-(blend
of dry Trinitrotoluene). DANGER! HIGH EXPLOSIVES. MUST BE STORED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH FEDERAL
REGULATIONS. KEEP IN COOL,
DRY, WELL VENTILATED, LOCKUP AREA...
Workers did not proceed with the rest of
the questionnaire until they had been able to
answer successfully some basic overall questions to test whether they had read the label.
The workers appeared to have little difficulty
in this regard since they had substantial
experience using chemicals labeled in this
manner. Although the information provided
was not with respect to a specific risk level
but for a chemical hazard for which risk
assessments will vary, the responses were

VOL. 74 NO. 5
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TABLE 4-VARIABLE

MEANS FOR EACH LABELING GROUP

Means of Variables with Alternative Labels
Risk Variable
RISK
RISK]
HRISK
HRISKJ
WBOOST
Risk Premiuma
NO WAGE
QUITA
QUITA1
TAKEA
TAKEA1
Sample Size

CARB

LAC

ASB

TNT

.12
.06
.42
.07
.03
0
0
.23
.00
.67
.90
31

.10
.18
.38
.83
.48
$1,919.01
.02
.10
.23
.82
.58
106

.09
.26
.29
.95
.71
$2,995.59
.11
.13
.65
.80
.11
102

.10
.31
.40
.98
.82
$5,158.31
.17
.10
.73
.76
.07
96

aRisk premium is YJ - Y. The figures are conditional upon facing an increased risk
and being willing to accept a finite risk premium.

consistent with the general patterns one might
expect. Table 4 summarizes the variable
means for each labeling group.
Before analyzing the principal economic
implications of the learning process, we will
first review the general pattern of the
responses and their plausibility. Sodium bicarbonate is a very safe substance, and this
label leads to a reduction in the RISK variable from .12 to .6 for RISK], where the
postscript I indicates the post-information
analogue of the variable. Besides halving the
assessed RISK level, CARB also dramatically reduced the fraction of workers who
believe they face above-average risk. Only
one respondent raised his RISK assessment
(from .05 to .06), but since this worker was
in a very low-risk job and had a posterior
RISK] value identical to the CARB subsample mean, this behavior cannot be regarded
as irrational.
If CARB were the only risk posed by the
worker's job, one would expect that the
workers would assess this risk as being zero.
Even when working with a safe sjibstance,
there is, however, a residual risk such as the
risk of a safety-related job injury from accidents. Since the RISK] value of .06 for
CARB equals the 1980 and 1981 average
BLS injury rate for the chemical industry,
the results are not out of line with what one
might expect once the chemical hazards have
been eliminated. In addition, not all workers
may have known what sodium bicarbonate

is. The label suggests that it is a very safe
chemical, but it does not explicitly state that
it is risk free.
The lachrymator was the second safest
substance in the labeling group. Workers
viewed this chemical as more hazardous than
their present environment, as the RISK level
almost doubled, and the fraction of workers
who considered themselves in above-average
risk jobs increased by .45. Eleven workers
did not revise their risk assessments upward
after seeing the LAC label, but these workers
were in very high-risk jobs; their RISK level
decreased from .19 to .15, which is still above
the average pre-information RISK value for
the sample. Notwithstanding the absence of
any assessed increase in risk for this subgroup, one person indicated that he was
somewhat likely to look for a new job
(QUITAI ) even though he had not expressed
this intention earlier, producing a minor consistency problem.
The asbestos warning led to a more
dramatic response. The riskiness of this substance relative to TNT is not clearcut because of the deferred nature of asbestos-related cancers. Asbestos is, however, a very
potent carcinogen, and it led workers to triple their assessed RISK levels, with almost
all workers viewing their jobs as above average in riskiness. Somewhat surprisingly, 5
percent of all workers did not view ASB jobs
as posing above-average risk. Moreover, a
substantial group of 26 workers, most of
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whom were in very high-risk jobs, did not
raise their risk perceptions. The unresponsive
group's reservation wage and quit responses
(for example, no increase in quits and
elimination of all QUITA =1 values) were
consistent with their RISK] values, so that
the RISK] variable appears to reflect a more
favorable assessment of the job's attractiveness. Such a favorable response is not implausible, particularly for researchers who
work with new unregulated carcinogens on a
daily basis.
The explosive hazards of TNT generated
the greatest risk assessment response, as all
but two workers now viewed their jobs as
above average in risk. Although 11 workers
did not raise their RISK assessments in response to the warning, these workers were on
very hazardous jobs (RISK equal to .19),
and on average the TNT warning lowered
their RISK value by only .04. There was,
however, one seemingly inconsistent respondent who indicated that he was somewhat
likely to quit (QUITAI) even though he
hadn't been earlier, and his assessed RISK
level had not increased.
As with the earlier results, there is a
widespread response to information in the
expected direction. The behavior of only a
small minority of the workers does not appear consistent with a rational learning process. This result does not, however, imply
that workers respond perfectly to new information since the relation between the four
labels and actual risk levels is not narrowly
defined. Some imprecision is inherent because of differences in individual susceptibility to risk.
To test the empirical implications of the
hazard warnings more fully, we will formalize the nature of the learning process. The
assumption here is that workers adopt a
Bayesian learning approach where their assessed probabilities belong to the beta family.
This distribution is ideally suited to analyzing independent Bernoulli trials on events
such as whether or not one suffers a job
accident.9 We will view the receipt of the
9See John Pratt, Howard Raiffa, and Robert Schlaifer
(1975) for more detailed advocacy of the use of beta
distributions for Bernoulli processes.
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new labeling information as equivalent to
observing additional Bernoulli trials concerning the riskiness of the job. The implicit
assumption is consequently that labels simply serve to augment the risk information
available to workers.'0
The two parameters of the prior distribution are p, the assessed prior probability of
an adverse outcome (i.e., RISK), and y, a
term that can be regarded as the precision of
the prior. After observing m unsuccessful
outcomes (for example, accidents) and n successful outcomes, the posterior accident
probability (yp + m)/(y + m + n). The term
y is tantamount to the number of trials the
worker acts as if he has experienced when
forming his prior.
The informational content of each label i
likewise depends on two parameters: {i, the
precision of the information (i.e., the equivalent number of observations m + n reflected
in the information) and si, the fraction of
these observations that are unfavorable.
Whether or not the label raises workers'
probability assessments depends on whether
Si exceeds p, and the extent of revision is
positively related to the informational content (i, for any given value of si. If workers
are provided with perfect information and if
the labeled chemical is the only risk, the
value of {i should be infinite. The labels do
not specify the exact chemical risk, so that (i
need not be infinite in practice. Moreover,
the label only conveys information regarding
the risks from direct chemical use so that all
accident-related risks and all environmental
chemical risks remain. Worker responses
consequently will reflect the relative weights
workers placed on the prior and posterior
information, where these weights will capture
both the degree to which the information in
the label was credible and the relative role of
this risk in the new version of the worker's
job.

10If workers do not in fact treat the label as equivalent to additional job experiences but rather "forget"
their earlier knowledge, no difficulties are caused provided that the degree of forgetting is determined by the
precision of their judgments, not the level of the risk. If
the initial risk level were also to affect the weight placed
on the label, the empirical estimates would be biased.

The posterior probability pi of an adverse
job outcome after receiving a hazard warning
for chemical i is given by
_

(1)

Pi-

is

=y

RISKJi

=

+

+ j

ai + /iRISKi

yp
y+

+ ui,

where ui is a random error term and
ai= y /+

3
pi

y+

To take into account the bounded nature of
the dependent variable, we will also estimate
the equations in terms of the log-odds of the
probability, or ln(RISK/(I - RISK)). In
this case, the parameters ai and fPifor the
linear regression counterpart can be derived
from the regression results but are not produced as directly.
The estimated versions of the parameters
in equation (2) also can be used to construct
two key measures of the information conveyed by the warning. The risk level si is
given by
a?il(ai -1),

Si

(3)

which can be verified using equation (2).
Similarly, the informational content of the
warning relative to the prior, %i,is given by
(4)

*i

=

ity of an accident and its severity, equation
(3) becomes
ai/(

siVi

(5)

Yp+ ~isi

The regression equation counterpart of
equation (1) for each chemical i is

(2)
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-1),

and the formulation and interpretation of
equation (4) remains unaltered." Although
the discussion below will be in probabilistic
terms and will not include Vi explicitly, it
should be noted that these risks are severity
weighted.
Table 5 summarizes the regression results
and the parameters calculated from them.
Overall, the linear variant of the equation
provided a better fit than the log-odds formulation. The coefficients ai and /Pi reflect
the nature of the learning process. In the
case in which workers' judgments are not
affected by the hazard warning and are solely
dependent on their prior value of RISK, ai
will equal 0 and fPiwill equal 1. At the other
extreme in which the hazard information is
dominant, fPi will equal 0 and ai will be
positive. The regression results were between
these two extremes. In all cases the label
provided a substantial input, and in two
cases the prior continued to play a significant
role. These results are broadly consistent with
a Bayesian learning model.
In the case of CARB, the label lowered the
RISK assessment but did not eliminate the
role of the prior, as both ai and /Pi were
statistically significant in the linear case
where the relation to equation (2) is direct.
The risk level s1 implied by CARB is .04, or
under half of the worker's prior RISK level,
and I, implies that the relative precision of

(/Y

Higher values of 'i imply greater informativeness of the label compared to the
worker's initial judgments.
To the extent that workers' risk responses
reflect not only changes in the probability of
an adverse outcome but also changes in their
severity, one must modify the formulas
above. Let Vi be the severity (i.e., monetary
equivalent) of the health impact posed by the
hazard warning relative to that posed by the
average U.S. job injury, which serves as the
metric for the analysis. If the RISK] responses reflect changes both in the probabil-

" More specifically, let VObe the original accident
severity and Vi be the severity of the postwarning
accident. Suppose that the components of RISK] represent a weighted average of these risks and that they take
the form
RISK] =YP/(

Y+ ()) Vo+ (O/Y

+ ()

Vi

If we set VOequal to 1 (no loss of generality), the values
of ai and P3iare given by
aj=t

siV,/(y+tj

and

fi=y/(y+,).

The severity-weighted results in the text follow directly.
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PERCEPTION AFTER INFORMATION REGRESSION RESULTS

CARB

Constant
RISK
R2
si
*i
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LAC

TNT

ASB

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.030
(0.014)
0.21
(0.10)
.12
.038
3.72

- 3.58
(0.46)
3.23
(3.56)
.03
.042
4.98

0.14
(0.01)
0.44
(0.10)
.14
.239
1.29

-2.05
(0.13)
3.76
(1.12)
.10
.274
0.83

0.25
(0.02)
0.14
(0.14)
.08
.289
6.43

-1.23
(0.11)
1.36
(1.03)
.02
.325
2.80

0.31
(0.02)
0.03
(0.13)
.01
.317
31.36

- 0.86
(0.09)
0.11
(0.76)
.01
.315
40.67

Note: All cols. (1) are RISK]

(linear); all cols. (2) are RISK]

the hazard warning was 4-5 times that of the
prior.
Since the very safe properties of sodium
bicarbonate are reasonably well known, one
might have expected that CARB would result in a larger relative precision estimate
and a lower s1 than was observed. A possible
explanation is that workers did not place an
infinite weight on a chemical exposure with
near zero risk because of the residual risks of
the job. These workers will continue to be
exposed to a variety of airborne carcinogens
and safety-related risks that will be reflected
in the posterior RISK] values. As the risks
captured by the label approach zero, the
nonzero risk components of the worker's job
become more instrumental since they dominate the role of the label.
The CARB label was, however, much more
powerful than the LAC warning. This label
led to the greatest retention of workers' prior
beliefs, as the RISK coefficients are the
largest of any of the regressions. A small
impact was not a consequence of any close
similarity in the hazard probabilities of LAC
and RISK, since s2 is over double the prior
value of RISK. The limited nature of the
effect derives from the lower relative precision '2 of this warning, which had roughly
the same informational content as did
workers' prior beliefs.
Warnings for the severe risks of ASB and
TNT are so powerful that the prior RISK
variable plays an insignificant role; only the
constant terms enter. The risk levels s3 and
s4 are somewhat higher than for LAC, but
the major difference is the precision of the
information. Asbestos warnings have roughly

(log-odds).

the same relative precision as LA C, but TNT
has especially large informational content,
roughly 30-40 times that of the prior. Since
TNT poses well known explosive risks, this
result is not unexpected.
Overall, the risk levels si implied by LAC,
ASB, and TNT were not too dissimilar. The
greatest difference was the relative precision
associated with these warnings. The impact
of a hazard warning does not hinge solely on
the implied risk level. In this instance, the
informational content of the label proved to
be more instrumental in altering workers'
probabilistic judgments. To be effective, hazard warnings must convey information in a
convincing manner. Otherwise, the weight
individuals place on their prior beliefs will
dominate in the formation of workers' risk
judgments.
III. The Effect of Learning on Worker Behavior

The change in the risk perceptions resulting from the hazard warnings in turn will
affect worker behavior if workers make
sequential decisions in an optimal manner.
The data in the bottom portion of Table 4
summarize the wage and turnover effects,
which reflect similar patterns of influence.
After reviewing the general nature of these
responses, we will use these responses to test
the key hypotheses regarding rational worker
behavior.
The demand for risk premiums is positively related to the change in the risk, as one
would expect. The fraction of workers who
indicate that they would require a higher
salary to be willing to work with the new
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chemical (WBOOST) is about three-fourths
for ASB and TNT. As noted above, there are
some workers with very high initial risk assessments that were not increased as a result
of the label so that not all workers will desire
extra compensation. The amount of extra
compensation demanded ranges from $2,000
for LAC to over $5,000 for TNT. Workers
need no risk premium to work with CARB.
(Indeed, they should be willing to take a pay
cut, but the survey did not address this possibility.) The premium estimates are only for
those workers willing to remain on the job in
return for extra pay. Some workers, particularly for TNT and ASB, were not willing
to state an acceptable reservation wage
( NO WAGE). Whether these 29 nonrespondents were unwilling to accept any finite risk
premium or simply believed that no adequate risk premium was feasible is unclear.
The effect on worker turnover was particularly dramatic since the experiment altered
the risk but did not alter the wage rate.
These risks consequently will produce a more
dramatic worker response than in a market
context where there would be some adjustment in the wage level. The QUITA] and
TAKEA1 questions pertained to the attractiveness of the current job, varying only
the risk. In the case of CARB, there was a 23
percent drop in quit intentions to zero, and
an equal increase in the percentage of workers
who would repeat their job choice. The
lachrymator produced a 13 percent increase
in quit intentions and a 24 percent drop in
workers willing to repeat their job choice.
The strongest effects were for ASB and TNT,
which would lead the majority of workers to
quit and almost all workers to be unwilling
to repeat their job choice.
An instructive check on the validity of
these responses is to analyze whether the
behavioral relationship governing. the risk
premium and quit decisions parallel those in
the pre-information situation. Such an analysis will also make possible an explicit test of
the impact of the risk si implied by the label
and its relative precision *i. Higher implied
risks si clearly should make the job less
attractive. The relative precision of one's risk
assessment will also increase workers' reservation wage since, as shown in Viscusi
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(1979), the value of a risky job is negatively
related to the precision of one's risk judgments. Jobs associated with looser probabilistic judgments are more attractive since
they offer greater potential gains from experimentation. Workers can terminate uncertain jobs if their learning is unfavorable and
reap the high expected rewards from jobs
associated with favorable on-the-job experiences. This asymmetry generates a predilection for loose priors. This aspect of adaptive
behavior is the most distinctive prediction of
the model, but it has never been the subject
of an explicit empirical test.
To analyze the effect of the hazard warnings on the level of compensating differentials, we first need some additional notation.
Let Y represent initial worker income, X be
a vector of all nonrisk variables for that job,
Z be the unmeasured effects specific to the
job-worker match, and u be the error term.
The compensating differential results in Section I focused on an equation of the form
(6)

Y=13X+13*RISK+3**y

+ Z+ u.

Since y and Z were omitted from the model,
the estimated coefficients were subject to
omitted variables bias.
The situation following information (denoted by postscript 1) can be modelled similarly, where
(7)

YJ = ,X + ,*RISKI

+ f**(y + ()+ Z + ul.
Subtracting equation 6 from equation 7 yields
(8)

Y1-Y=f*ARISK+?f**(+ul-u,

where A RISK is RISK] - RISK. Equation
(8) will yield consistent estimates of the
coefficients in this fixed effects model as the
sample size N -s o if there is sufficient variation in ARISK and .`12 It should be noted
that we do not have information on (i but

12 Use of the fixed effects model in compensating
differentials studies is not unprecedented. See Brown
and, more generally, see Gary Chamberlain (1982).
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TABLE6-POST-INFORMATION
EARNINGS
ANDQUITEQUATIONSa
Dependent
Variable

RISK
or A RISK

EARNG

9934.5
(5468.6)
12435.3
(2681.9)
9838.3
(5471.3)
12777.5
(2640.3)
.627
(.303)
.633
(.087)
.622
(.303)
.651
(.086)
-1.05
(2.03)
20.4
(4.3)
-1.07
(2.02)
20.6
(4.3)

AEARNG
EARNG
AEARNG
LNEARNG
ALNEARNG
LNEARNG
ALNEARNG
QUITA
AQUITA
QUITA
AQUITA

s
6784.2b

(3342.3)
6602.3c
(2684.2)
-

.456b

(.185)

52 ob
(32.2)
65.56b

(20.10)
41.6c
(19.6)
46.53c
(14.17)
.0021b
(.0018)
0027b

-

.424c
(.149)
-

5.95
(1.43)
-

5.75C
(1.17)
-

'

(.0007)
.0018c
(.0011)
.0019c
(.0005)
.027b

(.013b
.011
(.029)
.021c
(.008)
.002c
(.020)

R2/-2 Log
Likelihood
.24
.17
.24
,17
.28
.31
.28
.31
381.3
63.3
384.6
63.5

aAll cross-sectional equations include other explanatory variables as in Tables 2
and 3.
b
The 4 variable is based on the linear regression estimates reported in Table 5.
CThe 4 variable is based on the log-odds regression estimates reported in Table 5.

on i for each labeling group, which is i/y
Workers, however, will differ in the precision
of their priors, so that y will be a random
variable. Since the workers were assigned
randomly to each labeling group, the precision variable should be subject to random
measurement error, biasing the /3** coefficient downward.
Table 6 reports the earnings equations both
in the first difference form (i.e., AEARNG,
A LNEARNG) and in the cross-sectional form
for the post-information case, where the
RISK variable is of the samneform as the
dependent variable (ARISK). Since the first
differencing eliminates the biases from omitted fixed effects, the change in earnings equations will be estimated for the full sample,
while the cross-sectional results will focus on
the BC/TECH subsample as before. In the
case of the post-information cross section,
we included both RISK and s rather than
RISK] in order to estimate explicitly the

role of the risk implied by the warning. The
results reflect a consistent pattern of premiums for prior risks and risks communicated through the label. Similarly, labels
associated with high relative precision I generate additional premiums, as predicted.
The consistency of worker behavior with
the earlier results is more difficult to ascertain since premiums per unit of risk should
be larger since individuals will demand higher
rates of compensation if placed in a highly
risky job that is not consistent with their
preferences. Whereas the initially perceived
risks are the result of a voluntary self-selection process, the post-information risks are
not, and serious mismatches may occur.
Higher desired premiums per unit of risk
consequently should be observed.
The magnitude of the post-information
wage-risk tradeoff bears out this pattern. In
the case of the linear specifications, for example, the RISK and s coefficients average

VOL. 74 NO. 5

VISCUSI AND O'CONNOR: A DAPTI VE RESPONSES

about one-fifth higher than in Table 2, while
in the first difference form A?RISK commands premiums three-fourths larger. A
greater response is observed in the first differencing case because the additional desired
premiums per unit of risk for the added
hazard will be averaged only across the extra
risks, whereas the post-information cross section obtains an average unit risk premium
for the entire risk level. In addition, about
one-third of the discrepency arises because
the first differencing results focus on the full
sample, which is wealthier than the BC/
TECH subsample used in the cross sectional
results. These workers consequently demand
a larger premium per unit risk.'3
To analyze the change in workers' quit
decisions, we can formulate a post-information cross section and an analogue of the
fixed effects model for discrete variables.'4
The post-information quit intentions in the
cross-sectional results are driven exclusively
by the implied risk and precision of the
hazard, each of which has the expected positive effect. The most dramatic difference with
the earlier results is in the ARISK coefficients in the first difference equations, which
are almost three times larger than in the
preinformation results in Table 3. Such a
dramatic increase is not implausible since
quits arising in the market are in response to
a pay-risk package mix that the worker initially accepted. Here workers are responding
to often dramatic changes in their job's attractiveness so that the intensity of the response should increase. The AQUITA equations do not, however, lead to significant
coefficients for 'I, a result that may be due
'3Estimation of the EARNG and LNEARNG equations for the BC/TECH subsample yielded annual risk
premiums about $1,000 less than for the full sample.
14 Using the procedure developed by Chamberlain
(1980), we will restrict the sample to those individuals
who altered their quit decisions since sample observations involving the same quit responses provide no
useful information for the estimation. Those (0,1) responses who would quit after the warning but not before
(primarily from LAC, TNT, and ASB groups) constitute one of the binary outcomes and the (1,0) responses (primarily from CARB) constitute the other
outcome. The explanatory variables are the first differences of the variables included in the pre-information
equation so that only the risk-related variables remain.
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to the drop in sample size down to 161 as a
consequence of the statistical estimation procedure that has been used.
IV. Conclusion
The focus of this analysis has been on an
adaptive framework in which individuals do
not have perfect job risk information, but
instead continually revise their risk judgments in Bayesian fashion and then switch
jobs once these judgments become too unfavorable. This theory is an extension of the
standard compensating differential analysis
rather than an incompatible theory. Workers'
initial perceptions of risk led to compensating differentials and also generated intentions to quit and regret over having accepted
the job initially. The evidence of risk-related
job mismatches is consistent with a model of
job experimentation and would not occur in
a perfect information version of the compensating differential model. The extent of
these mismatches does not, however, appear
to be great, so that for this sample the market
appears to operate reasonably effectively.
After being given a hazard warning for use
of a new chemical in their job, workers revised their risk assessments in the expected
directions, but retained some influence of
their prior for hazard warnings with low
informational content. Although the risk level
implied by the label was of consequence,
differences in informational content appeared to be more influential in governing
one's posterior risk assessment. This learning
in turn generated a demand for risk premiums and incentives to quit, as predicted.
Both the change in the level of the risk and
changes in the precision of workers' judgments were of consequence, as the adaptive
model predicts. Although the change in the
risk level had a more consistent direct effect
on behavior than did the relative precision of
the hazard warning, the precision also has an
indirect influence through its powerful impact on the posterior risk assessment.
The pivotal influence of the informational
content of the chemical label has broad
ramifications for the design of effective risk
information strategies. Past informational
campaigns such as those intended to encour-
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age seatbelt use and deter cigarette smoking
have generated disappointing results. The
primary purpose of these efforts is that of
exhortation rather than providing consumers
with information that they did not already
possess. The lack of a major consumer response should not be unexpected since the
informational content of these warnings was
low. The results in this study indicate that
risk information programs will be most effective when they do not simply convey the risk
level, but they also provide individuals with
new information in a convincing manner.
Most workers behaved as expected, but
there was a small minority of alarmist responses as well as some inertia and inconsistencies. Moreover, while the empirical evidence constitutes the most refined test of the
Bayesian learning model of adaptive job
choice, observed consistency with the principal predictions of the theory does not necessarily imply full rationality. Nevertheless,
there is strong evidence of a systematic
worker response that is quite different from
the polar extremes of optimal decisions with
perfect prior information and random decisions by irrational workers.
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